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ETHICS OF CARING FOR TRANSGENDER
PERSONS

Clinicians and ethics consultants may encounter questions regarding the treatment
of transgender persons in many medical contexts. Providers may feel less confident
when trying to help transgender persons because they do not know enough about their
foremost needs and wants.
In this piece I discuss some key considerations for providers to best help these
persons. This includes understanding the right words to use, common critical needs,
and the importance of advocacy.
Overriding concerns for most transgender persons are two basic desires: the ability
to live authentically and to have others respond to them on the basis of who they are
as opposed to how they may look.1 These concerns underlie many of the guidelines I
outline below.
I. Using the Right Words
Providers should use
the most respectful words
to describe transgender
persons—the words requested
by transgender individuals
themselves. It is particularly important that providers of transgender persons see them
as the gender they are, i.e., the gender that they identify with.
Finding the right words here may be difficult: “Trans is a very new term … [It] is
meant to be a new umbrella term to represent all atypical genders. … Cis is a word
used to describe the opposite of trans.”2
First, providers should not refer to transgender persons as “patients.” I have thus far
intentionally used the word “person” instead of “patient.” This is because changing
or wanting to change one’s gender is not a disorder. Trans people may have disorders.
Being trans, however, is not a disorder. There is a distinction between transgender
identity and dysphoria. Gender dysphoria is discomfort or distress caused by a
discrepancy between an individual’s gender identity and the gender assigned at birth.
Some trans people have gender dysphoria but not all. It is a mistake then for providers
to refer to these people as “patients” since they may not have a disorder. Further, to
refer to them as patients when they may not have a disorder is implicitly stigmatizing.
Some individuals may have symptoms, such as depression, that meet the criteria for
a disorder. If this occurs, they should of course be diagnosed and treated. Depression
or anxiety, however, may be caused by living in a body that does not reflect their
vision of themselves. Thus, their feelings of depression may change after they change
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their bodily characteristics.
I recall one late adolescent male who
had, according to both his parents and
himself, felt depressed his entire life
since early childhood. Once he had
surgery to remove his breast tissue,
however, he reported feeling happy for
the first time, virtually overnight.
Providers should also use the right
pronouns. Providers should not
choose pronouns for a person, but
should simply ask the person, “What
pronouns would you like me to use
for you?” Transgender persons want
their providers to know their gender
and how they want to be addressed.
Providers should use the pronouns
people request, even if the provider
is unfamiliar with that pronoun. In
addition, it is important for providers
to call these individuals by the correct
first name, regardless of whether that
name is reflected on legal documents.
Some providers believe that these
persons should have to take the
initiative to tell the provider if they
would like their providers to call
them a name that corresponds with
their gender. This view, however,
is not ethically optimal because it
discriminates against transgender
persons less willing to take this
initiative. Thus, it may be better for
providers not knowing how to refer to
these individuals to take the initiative
and ask them.
II. Respecting Transgender Persons’
Individual Needs
Attempting to use the right words
is just one of many ways that
providers should attend to transgender
persons’ individual needs. Another
consideration is the much publicized
concern regarding bathroom use.
I recall meeting years ago with a
LGBT group of professionals. One of
its transgender members suggested
that, when feasible, there should be
three bathrooms instead of two, one
for men, one for women and one for
people of all genders. Some places
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are now creating these all-genders
restrooms. This is optimal as it
demonstrates the most respect for
trans identities, especially trans people
who are non-binary (i.e., they do not
identify as either men or women).
This third bathroom may, though,
be suboptimal if some transgender
persons are fearful of revealing their
transgender identity by entering the
bathroom.
Some may assert that this concern is
not problematic because transgender
persons should be as proud of who
they are as anyone else. While true,
this assertion fails to take into account
important subjective differences,
as well as the increased likelihood
of harassment and violence against
transgender people. For bathrooms,
as for all considerations, providers
should take into account the full range
of individual experiences. Some
transgender persons may not feel
sufficiently confident in their status
to let others know about it or may be
unwilling to face the increased risk of
harm. Providers should thus adjust to
what these persons individually need
rather than over-generalize based on
all transgender persons.
Transgender persons’ sexual
orientation—which indicates the
partners to whom they feel sexually
attracted—likewise, lies along a
spectrum. Regardless of gender
identity, persons may be attracted to
others of the same or the opposite
gender or both, and this may change
over time. The sexual feelings a
person experiences may also change if
they take hormones. Some trans men
may experience increased aggression
or agitation due to testosterone and
the libido of some trans women
taking estrogen may decrease.3 If
trans women have bottom surgery,
afterward they may have to continue
to dilate their vaginas. Providers can
benefit transgender persons by sharing
this knowledge with the transgender
persons in their care. All too often,
transgender persons report knowing

more about their medical realities than
the providers. Justifiably, transgender
persons want their providers to inform
them rather than the reverse.
III. Advocating for Transgender
Persons
Gender identity may differ
profoundly from one person to the
next and may cause differences in
transgender persons’ bodily goals.
These differences are best understood
as lying along a spectrum. Thus, some
persons may not want any bodily
changes or may want only some of the
bodily interventions available. Some
may want to stop after only having
taken hormones or after top, but not
bottom, surgery. Some may want all
possible bodily changes. Providers
should understand and respect this.
Further, some may differ in what
they want providers to know. Some
transgender individuals may not want
to disclose their transgender identity to
their providers if their medical needs
do not require it. Physicians may be
most accustomed to expecting that
patients will be open to disclosing
most private aspects of themselves.
For transgender persons, however, this
is not necessarily the case.
In addition to having the freedom
to be wholly themselves, transgender
persons also may need and want to
appear in a way that helps others
respond to their identities, not their
given physiology. Thus, some may
benefit from different kinds of medical
interventions that help change their
appearance. For example, some trans
women change their voice if they
feel it is too deep and eliminate facial
beard growth.
Transgender persons may need
providers to act as their advocates in
the pursuit of bodily interventions.
This may be especially true where
insurers require that prior to covering
transgender procedures (e.g., hormone
therapy or surgery) the treating
physician refer the trans person
to a therapist for evaluation and a
recommendation and when providers

who are not mental health specialists,
such as endocrinologists, want
psychological consultation prior to
prescribing medications. While this
in itself may be ethically questionable
in that it is highly paternalistic, it
may also raise ethical conflicts for the
therapist and the trans person. This
is the case when, for example, an
endocrinologist asks for a psychiatric
or psychological consult and a mental
health provider has already been
seeing the trans person for therapy to
support gender confirmation surgery
or other related interventions. If the
trans person knows that the provider
they are seeing for therapy may have
to make a recommendation regarding
an intervention in the future, the trans
person may be faced with having to
choose between sharing their genuine
feelings during therapy and taking
the risk that this will not maximize
the likelihood that the therapist will
recommend what the trans person
wants and sharing what they believe
will maximize the likelihood that the
therapist will approve the intervention.
The therapist may be in the position
of either supporting his/her client by
advocating what his or her client most
wants or being an objective evaluator
of what the therapist believes is best
for the client. If the therapist takes
this latter approach, he or she is acting
on his or her own view as opposed to
respecting the autonomy of the trans
person. This may harm the patient/
therapist relationship. Accordingly,
transgender persons and their
therapists should discuss potential
conflicts.
These evaluations may be
unwarranted. They may also
discriminate against trans persons in
that other persons seeking treatments
in comparable contexts are not
required to undergo such evaluations.
Therapists should then ask this
question: By offering an opinion, are
they morally complicit in this implicit
discrimination, and if not, why not?
If an evaluation is necessary for the
trans person to receive the intervention
he or she wants, the therapist then

could refer the evaluation to others
and/or advocate for the trans person
by telling the insurance company that
such evaluations are discriminatory.
Alternatively, transgender persons
and their therapists may agree on
objective criteria to decide whether to
recommend surgery. They may agree
in advance, for instance, on a length
of time that the transgender person
should live openly in the gender
they seek as a trial to help determine
whether this person still wants,
and thus should have, the desired
intervention.
In other instances, providers may
also need to specifically advocate for
transgender persons. For example,
trans men may want contouring
surgery to achieve visual traits
consistent with being male, which
can help avoid unwanted attention.4
Likewise, trans women may want
breast augmentation in addition to
estrogen.5 Providers should support
these interventions. Providers,
more than others, should know
how exceptionally important these
additional interventions may be to
transgender persons.
Adults rarely change their minds
after making bodily changes to
affirm their identities but children
may be different. The most difficult
decision for providers may be when
and whether to advocate for early
adolescents or even children who want
hormones or surgery to bring about
the body changes they want. Children
may want medications to prevent
or delay puberty that causes certain
changes. Children and adolescents
who want to change their bodies may
more commonly change their minds.
For example, recognized experts
Drescher and Pula report that, “as
the World Professional Association
for Transgender Health . . . notes in
its latest Standards of Care, gender
dysphoria in childhood does not
inevitably continue into adulthood.”6
Only 6 to 23 percent of boys and 12
to 27 percent of girls treated in gender
Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter 3

clinics showed a persistence of their
gender dysphoria into adulthood.
Gender dysphoria is different from
gender identity, however, so it is
unclear what clinical significance, if
any, this statistic should have.
The best approach may be to give
these younger persons more time to
be able to better determine who they
are and what they think is best for
them. This may be especially true
because there is still limited research
on this question.7 Puberty-suppression
regimes can provide this extra time to
children and adolescents. Providers
should be more cautious when
treating these individuals when the
interventions they want are more
irreversible.
A frequently used guideline for
determining when to initiate genderaffirming treatments is the length of
time transgender persons have lived
openly as their gender identity. The
strictness with which this criterion
should be applied, however, may vary
depending on several circumstances
such as the age of the person wanting
the intervention and the degree
to which this intervention can or
can’t be reversed. Here, however,
providers should also be aware that
in many contexts, it may be difficult
or impossible for transgender persons
to spend time living as the gender
they are. Thus, this criterion may best
remain open to allowing exceptions.
Finally, transgender persons may
want to have and raise children.
They may want medical help to do
this. Here again providers may find
that they can serve an important role
as advocates. Unfortunately, trans
persons may encounter exceptional
difficulties when seeking to have
children because of lingering false
beliefs that LGBT persons may be
less effective as parents. Providers
should know that this is not the
case and they should be willing to
advocate accordingly for transgender
persons who seek to be parents.8
Fortunately, this and similar false
4 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

and discriminatory beliefs are now
changing. For example, one court has
recently held that a non- biological,
non-adoptive partner should have
legal standing for both visiting and
custody privileges. The court said
that discriminatory views regarding
same sex partners are currently
“unsustainable.”9
Providers seeking an excellent
and regularly updated source of
optimal standards of care may find
guidance from the World Professional
Association for Transgender Health
website (WPATH).10 The most recent
guidance, Number 7, was issued in
2011 and is used worldwide.
Edmund G. Howe III, MD, JD
Professor of Psychiatry
Director, Programs in Ethics
School of Medicine, USUHS
Senior Scientist
Center for the Study of Traumatic
Stress (CSTS)
NOTE: The opinions or assertions

contained herein are the private views
of the author and are not necessarily
those of the AFRRI, USUHS, or the
Department of Defense. The author
would like to thank Sam Williamson, a
2d year law student at the University of
Maryland School of Law, who provided
helpful comments on an initial draft of
the article.
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ORGAN DONATION & TRANSPLANTATION: ETHICS,
RELIGION, & INTERPROFESSIONAL COLLABORATION
On November 1, 2016, MHECN, in
collaboration with the University of
Maryland, Baltimore (UMB) Schools
of Law, Medicine, Nursing, Pharmacy,
and Social Work, the UMB Graduate
School, and the Institute for Jewish
Continuity, co-sponsored the Third
Annual Interprofessional Forum on
Ethics and Religion in Health Care:
Challenges in Organ Donation and
Transplantation.
Silke Niederhaus, MD, clinical
assistant professor of surgery at
the University of Maryland School
of Medicine, provided a unique
perspective on being both a transplant
surgeon and an organ recipient (she
received a kidney transplant in 1988).
She recounted a school assignment
after her kidney transplant to
“Describe what your life would be like
as a 12-13 year old if you had been
born one century ago.” She turned in
the following minimalist (and selfproclaimed “cheeky”) essay: “I would
have been dead.” Indeed, lives saved
by transplant medicine burgeoned
after advances in post-transplant
immunosuppressants reduced organ
rejection rates and improved transplant
outcomes. Still, demand for organs
outstrips supply, raising ethical
questions about methods for increasing
supply and fairly allocating available
organs.
A precursor to transplant ethics
occurred when Scribner and
colleagues invented the “Scribner
shunt” in 1960, which allowed
people otherwise dying from kidney
failure to receive outpatient kidney
dialysis. Given the limited supply of
dialysis machines, a lay committee
was assembled in Seattle in 1961 to
decide who should get access to the
twice-weekly dialysis. The seven
committee members (dubbed the
“God Committee” in a landmark Life
Magazine article) grappled with the

value-laden task of
selecting recipients.
They notoriously
considered social
worth criteria and
favored individuals
like themselves. The
Seattle committee
stands in contrast to
today’s transplant
review committees
and ethics
committees, which
are held accountable to more objective
and transparent criteria when faced
with decisions about allocating scarce
resources.
Dilemmas associated with allocating
kidney dialysis were averted after
more dialysis centers emerged and
a patient advocacy campaign led
Congress to pass the End Stage
Renal Disease (ESRD) Act in 1972,
which provides reimbursement for
kidney dialysis through a Medicare
supplement. While individuals
with kidney failure have an option
in dialysis, 18 people waiting for
a life-saving organ transplant die
every day. In the 1980s, news of
organs being bought and sold raised
concerns about exploitation. Congress
responded by passing the National
Organ Transplant Act (NOTA)
in 1984, which made it illegal to
compensate organ donors. NOTA
was amended in 1988 to establish
Organ Procurement Organizations
(OPOs) through a contract with the
United Network for Organ Sharing
(UNOS), which currently oversees
58 OPOs in the U.S. and territories
in 11 regions. NOTA’s Final Rule,
implemented in 2000, called for
reducing the criteria for organ wait
list candidates, prioritizing medical
urgency, and identifying standardized
objective medical criteria to assess
medical urgency of those on an organ

transplant wait list.
Another milestone
in transplant medicine
was the passing of the
Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act (UAGA) in
1968, which regulates
the donation of organs,
tissues, and other
human body parts in
the U.S. Notably, to
facilitate adherence
to the “Dead Donor
Rule” (that a person must be dead
before life-preserving organs can be
procured), the UAGA established
death of a person as occurring when
there is irreversible cessation of
either: (1) circulatory and respiratory
functions, or (2) all functions of the
entire brain, including the brain stem.
This established two protocols for
procuring cadaver organs: (1) after
neurologic death (“brain death”) or (2)
after cardiac death.
Living Legacy Foundation (LLF),
Maryland’s OPO, in collaboration
with staff from the University of
Maryland Medical Center (UMMC),
presented two simulations at the
November 1 conference depicting
best practices for approaching family
members about organ donation after
neurologic death. The first simulation
involved the mother of a teenager
who had been shot (played by Laurel
Gaffney, MS, LLF’s Manager of
Hospital Services), the physician in
charge of the boy’s care (played by
Nirav Shah, MD, Program Director
for the Pulmonary and Critical Care
Fellowship program at UMMC), a
nurse transplant coordinator (Tyree
Nutter, RN, MA, UMMC’s Organ
and Tissue Donor Program’s in-house
coordinator), an OPO family services
coordinator (Heba Youssef, LLF’s
Family Services Coordinator), and a
Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter 5

hospital chaplain (Rabbi Ruth Smith,
UMMC’s Lead Chaplain for organ
transplant). The goal for this encounter
was to explain to the mom that her son
had died, based on tests confirming
irreversible loss of brain function
(e.g., unreceptivity/unresponsivity
in absence of hypothermia or central
nervous system depressants, no
movement or reflexes, no breathing
after ventilator removal for 10
minutes, a flat EEG, and lack of blood
flow to the brain). Communicating
this news with compassion, addressing
the mom’s strong emotions, and
minimizing medical jargon, were key.
The second simulation involved the
same individuals with Youssef taking
the lead in explaining the option of
organ donation to the mom. Separating
these discussions is one way in which
clinicians protect against role conflicts
resulting from dual obligations to
care for a dying patient and to support
the organ donation process for the
benefit of organ transplant recipients.
One challenge that OPO staff deal
with is explaining the process of
organ procurement to grieving family
members. The bodies of patients
confirmed to be dead by neurologic
criteria are “treated” with mechanical
ventilation, drugs, and (if allowed
by family) even cardiac resuscitation
attempts (if the heart stops beating
before the surgical team is ready to
procure the organs) to preserve organs
for donation. In donation after cardiac
death, loved ones have a matter of
minutes to “say goodbye” after the
patient is pronounced dead before
the surgical team initiates organ
procurement surgery. OPO staff do all
they can to minimize loved one’s grief
and distress by explaining procedures
and their purpose in advance and
respecting patients’ and families’
spiritual and religious beliefs and
practices.
Another challenge faced by OPO
staff is complying with a revision
to the UAGA implemented in 2006,
which directs OPOs to notify family
6 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

of a designated donor rather than
obtain surrogate consent for organ
procurement after brain death is
confirmed (called “first person
authorization”). Some OPOs have
gone to court to compel organ
procurement for a designated donor
if a family objects to organ donation.
In states like Ohio, where OPOs have
taken such a strong stance, there has
been some backlash against organ and
tissue donor registration; critics argue
that current organ donor registration
practices (e.g., at motor vehicle
administrations) do not provide valid
informed consent (Iltis, 2015). Thus,
OPOs and other organizations that
promote organ and tissue donation are
looking for ways to educate the public
and encourage designated donors to
talk with their loved ones about their
preferences.
Anita Tarzian, PhD, RN, MHECN’s
Program Coordinator and member of
LLF’s ethics committee and Clinical
Advisory Board, touched on some
of the many ethical conflicts arising
in transplant medicine (see Focus
on Organ Procurement Strategies
on page 7). She told the story of
Marylander Daniel Canal, who in
1992, at age 13, ended his five-year
wait on a transplant list after raising
national media attention about his long
wait in Pennsylvania for a liver and
intestines transplant. The combination
of media attention and shorter organ
wait list times in Florida led to Daniel
finally getting the transplant surgery
he needed. Daniel subsequently had
three surgeries to transplant a liver,
intestines, pancreas, and stomach from
three donors. His body rejected the
intestines from the first donor. The
emergent nature of the second surgery
resulted in a less-than-ideal match and
subsequent liver transplant failure. The
final set of organs from a deceased
child in Puerto Rico have worked
to this day. Daniel’s case embodies
many of the ethical issues transplant
medicine presents, including:
• Is it fair to give multiple organs
to one person?

• Is it fair to re-transplant someone
with organs that could go to those
on the wait list awaiting an initial
transplant?
• Is preserving geographic priority
of cadaver organs the fairest way
to allocate them?
• What is the proper role of media
appeals for those on an organ
transplant list?
• What constitutes informed
consent (and assent) for organ
transplant?
• What obligations do we owe to
donor families?
• What obligations do we owe to
patients after transplant?
Rabbi Shmuel Silber addressed the
role of religious beliefs in decisionmaking related to organ donation and
transplantation. Most religions place
high value on saving lives and thus are
generally supportive of organ donors
and recipients. Regarding living
organ donation, risks include physical
harm to oneself, lost wages, time
away from family, or disappointment
if a recipient’s transplant outcomes
are not what was hoped. These
risks must be weighed against the
benefits of altruistic feelings of
accomplishment, personal growth,
increased self-esteem, and for some,
fulfilling religious duty. However,
religious persons may also succumb
to feelings of guilt serving as primary
motivator. Truly informed consent
requires understanding the risks and
benefits, and making a free choice
that is consistent with one’s life plans,
beliefs, and values. Such decisions
require thoughtful reflection/prayer
and, when appropriate, consultation
with a trusted member of the clergy.
One area of misunderstanding is
Orthodox Jewish interpretations of
when a patient is considered dead
such that organs may be procured.
Many observant Jews define death as
the moment when cardiopulmonary
function irreversibly stops, so if
Cont. on page 8

FOCUS ON ORGAN
PROCUREMENT STRATEGIES
Should family be allowed to direct the donation of a loved one’s organs?
In general, directing organs from a dead donor to a social group is not
allowed. However, a surrogate can direct a loved one’s organs to a named
person, hospital, or health organization. The opposition to these requests is mostly justice-based. If the organs would
otherwise be wasted, utilitarians would lean toward allowing this, but would also consider the bad press that could
result, which could damage the transplant enterprise. Thus, OPO staff encourage non-directed donation before
pursuing requests for directed donation.
Is it OK to advertise for an organ?
Individuals have mounted media campaigns to solicit either a living organ donation or a directed cadaveric
donation. While this favors those with financial means and social connections for such campaigns, it may also
increase public awareness, which could lead to increased organ donor registration. OPO staff and transplant programs
must remain vigilant to avoid commercializing the process of organ donation and transplantation (Veatch &
Ross, 2015).
What’s wrong with buying and selling organs?
The National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) prohibits selling organs in the U.S. In other countries, evidence of
widespread exploitation and human organ trafficking has highlighted the dark side of allowing an open market for
organ trade. Exploitation of the poor and marginalized individuals in China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh
have made headlines. So far, Iran is the only country that has legalized and regulates marketed living donor organs.
Payment is between $4,000 to $8,000. In 2010, 70% of kidneys transplanted in Iran were living unrelated, 5% related,
and 25% deceased. Proponents claim this induces less familial pressure, especially on women (Veatch & Ross, 2015).
Conditions in the U.S. make it highly unlikely we will ever adopt a market approach to resolve the issue of shortage
of organs for transplantation.
Why not switch to an opt-out model for organ procurement after death?
An “opt-out” model for organ procurement after death involves allowing organ procurement to proceed unless
one has registered beforehand to opt out. Countries closer to a communitarian or socialist culture are more apt to use
this method. Veatch and Ross (2015) criticize the terminology of “presumed consent” for this model, arguing that
it’s inaccurate to conclude that individuals who failed to opt out have given valid informed consent. An unintended
consequence could be that larger numbers than anticipated would opt out, resulting in the number of organs being
procured dipping below the current rate of about 75%. Deontologists (ethicists focusing on duties regardless of
outcomes) might argue that those who would want to opt out might be different from others in ways that discriminate
and thwart their ability to opt out, such as applying for a driver’s license or having access to the opt-out information
and process steps. Deontologists might also propose that even if an opt-out procedure resulted in a net gain of organs
for transplantation, it would not be worth it to procure organs from some objectors who failed to opt out. Since most
cadaveric organs in the U.S. are procured by family consent at the time of death, rather than by people registering as
designated donors, it’s unlikely that we will take the risks described above by switching to an opt-out system.
REFERENCE
Veatch, R.M. & Ross, L.F. (2015). Transplantation Ethics (2nd Ed.), Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
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Organ Donation & Transplantation: Ethics, Religion, & Interprofessional Collaboration
a patient is declared dead based
on neurologic criteria but is on a
ventilator and his or her heart is
still beating, an Orthodox Jew may
consider the person to still be alive.
Clinicians who don’t appreciate
the distinction between a medical
or legal definition of death and a
religious interpretation may think such
individuals don’t understand what
brain death means. Observant Jews
may fully understand that their loved
one’s brain function is permanently
lost and accept the “brain dead”
diagnosis, but they simply may not
equate the irreversible loss of brain
function (a medical judgment) with
the death of the person (a value
judgment). How clinicians and policy
makers should accommodate this
religious belief deserves thoughtful
reflection.
Sterling Brown from the Jordan
Taylor Brown (JTB) Foundation
(http://www.jtbrownfoundation.org)
opened the morning panel session
describing how the Foundation
honors the legacy of its namesake,
Sterling’s younger brother, who
became an organ donor after his
untimely death from senseless gun
violence. Mr. Brown described his
family’s experience learning that
Jordan had registered as an organ and
tissue donor as they were absorbing
the news of his death. Jordan’s organs
saved seven others’ lives and restored
two individuals’ eye sight. The JTB
Foundation is working to spread a
message of peace over violence, and
to encourage individuals to register as
organ and tissue donors. When asked
how to approach someone resistant
to registering as an organ donor for
fear that clinicians won’t work as
hard to save his or her life, Mr. Brown
suggests that such individuals can
always decline to register and still tell
their families that they wish to be an
organ and tissue donor if they are ever
in a position to donate.
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Laurie Thompson, RN, UMMC’s
Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE)
Coordinator, described how the PKE
helps match donors with recipients. If
a live donor wants to give a kidney to
a friend or relative but is incompatible
with the recipient, the program lists
that individual as a potential donor
to another recipient. In exchange, the
donor’s friend or relative is guaranteed
a kidney from a matching donor on
the list. It’s critical to ensure that all
parties are adequately informed and
that living donors are making a free
choice.
The morning conference panel
culminated with Lindsey Pote,
PharmD, Program Director of the
PGY2 Solid Organ Transplantation
Residency at The Johns Hopkins
Hospital, giving an overview of the
role of the transplant pharmacist
in educating transplant patients
about their lifelong need for
immunosuppression and how posttransplant medication management
must be tailored to each individual.
Adherence barriers such as excessive
medication costs, incompatibility with
other medications, and managing side
effects are routinely addressed.
The conference afternoon session
included a simulated ethics committee
discussion about a case involving
a patient declined by a transplant
program to be listed for a liver
transplant due to lack of six months
of alcohol sobriety. The ethics of
transplant medicine involves balancing
efficiency (e.g., maximizing benefit
and minimizing harm) and equity
(justly allocating scarce resources).
From an equity perspective, some
feel alcoholics in general don’t have
as high a claim to a liver transplant
because their actions caused their
liver failure. Yet, equity also demands
treating like cases alike. Many would
judge barring alcoholics from liver
transplants but not others whose selfinjurious behaviors contributed to their
organ failure as unfair, particularly

Cont. from page 6

since alcoholism is a chronic disease,
with alcohol recidivism a symptom
of that disease. From an efficiency
perspective, research has shown that
alcoholics with cirrhosis do well
after transplant, and that requiring
six months or more of sobriety prior
to transplant has not been shown
to produce better post-transplant
outcomes (particularly if patients
have strong social support and lack
other predictors of poor outcomes)
(Chodhary et al., 2016). While NOTA
and UNOS provide guidance to
transplant programs regarding organ
wait listing criteria, actual listing
criteria and the wait list vetting
process varies among transplant
programs. Usually, decisions are
made by the program’s transplant
review committee, but occasionally, a
hospital ethics committee is asked to
weigh in. What makes these decisions
so difficult is the reality that listing a
sicker patient for an organ transplant
will deprive another patient farther
down the list of that organ. Veatch and
Ross (2015, p. 354) acknowledge this
dilemma, but conclude: “We know of
no sound theoretical basis for arguing
for any particular formula that would
establish exactly what the proper ratio
should be for considering present
need and over-a-lifetime need.” The
work of transplant review committees,
clinicians, and ethics committees in
weighing these decisions is no small
task.
REFERENCES
Choudhary N.S. et al. (2016). Liver
transplantation for alcohol-related
liver disease. Journal of Clinical and
Experimental Hepatology, 6(1), 47-53.
Iltis, A.S. (2015). Organ donation, brain
death and the family: Valid informed
consent. J Law Med Ethics, 43(2), 36982.
Veatch, R.M. & Ross, L.F. (2015).
Transplantation Ethics (2nd Ed.),
Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press.

CASE PRESENTATION
One of the regular features of this Newsletter is the presentation of a case considered by an ethics committee and an
analysis of the ethical issues involved. Readers are both encouraged to comment on the case or analysis and to submit
other cases that their ethics committee has dealt with. In all cases, identifying information about patients and others in the
case should only be provided with the permission of the patient. Unless otherwise indicated, our policy is not to identify
the submitter or institution. We may also change facts to protect confidentiality. Cases and comments should be sent to
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or MHECN, Law & Health Care Program, University of Maryland Francis King Carey
School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21201.
CASE STUDY FROM A TERTIARY CARE HOSPITAL
“Brenda” is a 79 year old former Opera soprano who has been separated from her husband, “Vince,” for the past 10
years. They never divorced and remain friends. Brenda moved in with her partner, “Janice,” after separating from Vince
10 years ago. Brenda has no children. Brenda has moderate to severe Alzheimer’s disease, and has been managed thus far
with support from an extensive network of friends and family, and home health assistants who visit the home 3-5 times
a week. Until about three months ago, Brenda was attending an adult dementia daycare program and enjoying outings
such as concerts and visits to the Botanic Gardens. Despite her memory and cognitive deficits, she seemed to enjoy daily
activities. Over the past three months, her physical condition deteriorated, with a hospital admission two months ago for
pneumonia.
Brenda is now admitted to the hospital again for pneumonia, thought to be caused by aspiration. A swallow study
confirms she is at risk for aspiration. The medical team recommends that she avoid oral intake and that a g-tube be
placed and tube feedings initiated to avoid repeat aspirations. Hospital staff determine that Brenda lacks capacity to make
medical decisions. Janice tells the team that Brenda would not want the g-tube placed, as she loves to eat (particularly
sweets and red wine). Janice requests that Brenda be allowed to eat and drink what she wants. She says the home
caregiving team will try to minimize the risk of aspiration as best they can but that making Brenda forego oral food/
nutrition is not worth the impact on her quality of life. In other words, she thinks Brenda would prefer to take the risk
of aspirating by eating foods she likes, even if this hastens her death. She asks that Brenda be allowed to resume oral
feedings pending discharge home, and says she will follow up with home hospice. The physician in charge is reluctant to
certify that Brenda is in a terminal condition to qualify for hospice. He asks for an ethics consultation to explore whether
allowing Brenda to resume oral feedings while in the hospital or at home—foregoing the g-tube—might be considered a
form of elder neglect. Brenda has no advance directive.
COMMENTS FROM A SPEECHLANGUAGE PATHOLOGIST
Ambiguity of ethical decisionmaking can be reduced by considering
multiple perspectives and attending to
facts. Toward this end, I will address
the following questions:
• What is the physiology of the
swallowing disorder?
• What are the proposed
intervention certainties and
uncertainties?
• Who is the legal health care
decision maker?
• Who else should be contacted to
contribute relevant information?
• What constitutes elder neglect?

• Is a hospice referral appropriate
at this stage?
• Is it ethically justifiable to ask
a patient or surrogate to sign
a waiver to acknowledge risks
of behaviors not medically
recommended?
Physiology & Disease Progression
Brenda has advanced Alzheimer’s
dementia (AD). Some aspects of the
disease can be tempered but AD is
incurable. Inherent in the disease are
features leading to a gradual loss of
appetite, influenced by changes in
taste, loss of cognitive abilities to
process what food is, and changes
such as narrowing of the visual field.
Adaptations may delay the inevitable

weight loss (such as creating color
contrast between the plate, the table
and the food to promote self-feeding
as an adaption to visual changes). The
swallow mechanism will be affected
(dysphagia), initially with food staying
in the mouth because the person does
not realize what it is. This results
in food falling from the front of the
mouth, staying unswallowed in parts
of the mouth, such as the cheeks, and
at times falling back into the throat
before the person is ready to swallow.
This may lead to coughing as the food
enters the airway (aspiration). If the
cough reflex is depressed and there
is no reaction, this is called “silent
aspiration.”
Why do clinicians exhibit alarm
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when the concept of aspiration is
raised? Historically, clinicians noted
that people with dysphagia got chest
infections and thus blamed the poor
swallow. However, research has
shown us that it is not whether one
aspirates but what one aspirates
that is the problem. People who fall
into cold rivers and nearly drown
have lungs full of water but do not
necessarily go on to develop chest
infections. How then might a little
food and drink cause a problem,
and how is it that people who are
not taking oral food or drink still
get chest infections? To be brief, the
mouth is a dirty place with many
microbes, some of which are not
meant to be there. But the healthy
person has defenses and a lower
risk of chest infections. The primary
defense is to keep the microbes
under control, which requires manual
brushing of the teeth and gums (or
dentures, or just gums!), to have a
working swallow mechanism, to eat
and drink in a position that lessens the
chance of material sneaking into the
lungs, and to have a good infectionfighting mechanism. Impairments
in any of these cause problems.
The factor most strongly associated
with developing a chest infection is
dependence on others for feeding
(Langmore et al., 1998). Other
factors include poor oral care (which
no one wants to do), number of
decayed teeth, tube feeding, comorbid
10 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

conditions, multiple medications, and
smoking—but not dysphagia.
To continue living, a person
with AD will at some point need
supplementation, which typically
is tube feedings. A feeding tube is a
medical intervention and so it (and
feedings through it) can be withheld
or withdrawn just like any other
treatment. In reality, the emotional
connections and symbolism of eating
and of providing food and drink to
those we love as an act of caring
results in greater psychological
discomfort when considering
withdrawing this treatment, even
among physicians (Christakis &
Asch, 1993). Thus, the treatment
may be continued in the absence of
benefit, keeping people alive long
after a natural death might have
occurred, at times causing increased
burden, or hastening death in some
cases.
Evidence shows that feeding tube
use in dementia does not ameliorate
the problems historically presumed,
such as poor nutritional status, skin
breakdown, and slowed wound
healing (Teno et al., 2012). There
are downsides to tube feedings:
increased risk of reflux from the tube
feed, leading to aspiration of stomach
contents, leading to pneumonitis
(Marik, 2001). Infection at the
feeding tube’s entry site is more
likely to occur (Blomberg, Lagergren,
Martin, Mattsson, & Lagergren,

2012). Discomfort and associated
behaviors such as pulling at the tube
and resulting combative actions
may result in the use of chemical or
physical restraints. Thus, the potential
use of a feeding tube requires careful
consideration of the disease path, the
costs, benefits, and possible harms.
Appropriate professionals should
be consulted, such as a speechlanguage pathologist who can provide
advice such as how to maintain oral
health and minimize the risk of lung
infections (e.g., positioning Brenda
upright when she is eating and
drinking, not feeding her when she
is drowsy, letting her choose finger
foods, and making nutritious AND
palatable items easily available to her
to graze on).
Who is the Legal Decision Maker?
From the information we have, it
sounds like Brenda and Janice did
at least have “The Conversation”
(see http://theconversationproject.
org/), but Brenda’s wishes were never
formally documented, such as in an
advance directive appointing Janice
as Brenda’s health care agent (HCA).
Maryland’s Health Care Decision’s
Act (HCDA) recognizes the “patient’s
spouse or domestic partner” as
the authorized decision-maker for
patients lacking decision-making
capacity who have no appointed
HCA or guardian and are considered
to be in a terminal or end-stage
condition. “Terminal” is defined
as an “incurable condition caused
by injury, disease, or illness which,
to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, makes death imminent and
from which, despite the application of
life–sustaining procedures, there can
be no recovery” (HG §§5-601(u)).
“Imminent” is not defined. “Endstage condition” is defined as “an
advanced, progressive, irreversible
condition caused by injury, disease,
or illness that has caused severe and
permanent deterioration indicated
by incompetency and complete
physical dependency, and for which,

to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, treatment of the irreversible
condition would be medically
ineffective” (HG §§5-601(j)). It’s
unclear whether Brenda meets criteria
for either.
Since Brenda separated from Vince
a decade ago but never divorced,
it’s unclear whether Vince’s legal
status as Brenda’s husband trumps
Janice’s status as domestic partner,
unless Vince is unwilling to serve
as surrogate, or Brenda retains the
cognitive capacity to appoint Janice
as her HCA. That Brenda and Vince
have remained friends may bode
well for cooperative decision-making
between Vince and Janice. Whether
Vince has a legal claim in decisionmaking is a secondary concern to
whether Brenda, if she could tell us,
would value or dismiss his input.
Even when people are divorced they
sometimes remain close and value
each other’s advice. As with other
scenarios where the patient cannot
speak for herself, we try to gather
information from all sources to
build a picture of what the person
might have wanted. If uncertainty
remains regarding Brenda’s wishes,
her extended network of friends and
family, and her primary care provider
may also provide insight.
Appropriate Hospice Referral or
Elder Neglect?
Any person of sound mind can
refuse medical interventions. This
becomes more difficult when
someone else is making a decision
to refuse an intervention (e.g., tube
feedings) and consent to a plan of
care that prioritizes quality of life
over life prolongation (e.g., hospice
and pleasure feedings). If Brenda
is considered to have a terminal
or end-stage condition, then it is
acceptable to withhold artificial
nutrition/hydration. If she is not
considered to be in either condition,
then decision-making may require
more discussion, particularly absent
an advance directive. The physician

raises the serious issue of elder
neglect. The ethics consultant should
acknowledge that the physician is
thinking broadly about consequences,
perhaps framing the lack of nutrition
and possible increased pneumonia
risk with oral feedings as the primary
considerations. The physician may
feel that allowing Brenda to forego
tube feedings and to eat or drink
by mouth represents a professional
breach of ethics. Why? Until very
recently the received wisdom was that
physicians must maintain life. But
equally we might consider whether an
unwanted medical intervention with
the possible negative consequences
outlined above would be a form of
physical (and psychological) abuse.
The medical team should focus on
what is the standard of care for this
particular patient in her particular
condition.
Whether a patient is considered
to be hospice eligible is a matter
of professional judgment. The
designation as “terminal” for
hospice differs from the definition
in the HCDA—generally, a patient
should have a life expectancy of
six months or less. Physicians who
do not routinely certify patients for
hospice may be unfamiliar with the
criteria used to designate a patient as
terminally ill. There is often a fear
from physicians that: a) if they certify
a patient for hospice care and the
patient lives beyond six months, the
clinician will be penalized, and/or b)
the patient or family might perceive
it as the medical team giving up on
them. In most cases, a discussion
with the hospice medical director or
palliative care colleagues will clear
up any ambiguity, and the earlier
the better (American Academy of
Hospice and Palliative Medicine,
2017).
Pleasure Feeding & Waivers
Allowing Brenda to eat or drink
by mouth for pleasure despite
her swallowing impairments
understandably makes some

clinicians fearful of doing more harm
than good. This issue often comes up
in the long-term care environment,
where patients or surrogates are
sometimes asked to sign “waivers”
(see Alternative Treatment Consents
on page 12) releasing the facility
from liability if they choose to engage
in a behavior contrary to clinical
recommendations. Is this ethically
justified?
According to the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services
(2016), patients’ rights (and those
of their health care decision-makers
where decisional capacity is an
issue) must be respected in their care
plan—they can consent to and refuse
treatment, without fear of retribution,
coercion or cessation of general care.
It’s stated:
“This provision addresses assisted
nutrition and hydration, and, like
all treatments, residents have the
right to accept or refuse. Accepting
a resident’s refusal, or deferring
to their documented preferences,
does not absolve a facility of its
responsibilities to provide adequate
nutrition or permit the facility not to
meet a resident’s nutritional needs.
It does recognize that a competent
resident has the right to make
choices about assisted nutrition
and hydration and that there are
circumstances where failure to
maintain acceptable parameters of
nutritional status are not a reflection
of failure(s) of care” (Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services,
2016, p. 68849).
This means that if a patient chooses
an approach different to that advised
by the facility, even if the patient
cannot maintain her nutritional
status or has increased risk of lung
infections from oral intake, then such
outcomes will not be considered a
fault of the facility (presuming the
decision is informed and efforts are
made to minimize risks).
Cont. on page 12
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WAIVERS
ALTERNATIVE TREATMENT
CONSENTS
Medicare and Medicaid regulations affirm an individual’s right to
refuse medical recommendations, even if this exposes the individual
to harm. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
provides guidance to health care facilities (such as nursing homes)
regarding how to address such refusals. Facility administrators and
staff may fear being blamed and sanctioned if patients or residents
under their care choose to disregard medical advice and experience
harm. One solution implemented by some facilities is to have the
resident or surrogate sign a waiver document in which they absolve
the facility from liability. This is not recommended. Instead, CMS
encourages facilities to ensure that the following duties have been met
when faced with refusal of medical recommendations (CMS, 2016):
• Assess the resident’s decision-making capacity and involve
the health care agent or legal representative if capacity is
determined to be lacking;
• Determine and document what the resident is refusing;
• Assess the reasons for the refusal;
• Advise the resident about the consequences of refusal;
• Offer pertinent alternative treatments; and
• Continue to provide all other appropriate services.
Lawyers Kelly MacDonald and Michael Seale provide examples of
“Alternative Treatment Consents,” which allow a facility to document
their efforts to honor a patient’s or resident’s choice while meeting
CMS’ regulations. Their list of “Do’s and Don’ts When Developing
Alternative Treatment Consents,” and examples, is available at https://
www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/
LTC15/ee_mcdonald_seale.pdf.
REFERENCES
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2016). State Operations Manual
Appendix PP, Guidance to Surveyors for Long Term Care Facilities, F 155
§ 483.10(b)(4) and (8). Available at: https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/som107ap_pp_guidelines_ltcf.pdf.
McDonald, K.A. & Seale, M. (n.d.). Management of Healthcare Decision
Making in Nursing Facilities: Who Gets to Decide? Available at: https://
www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/LTC15/
ee_mcdonald_seale.pdf.
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Case Presentation
Cont. from page 11
Crucial in this situation is that
the dialogue of discussion has
been carefully documented. That
is, a clear record should be kept of
all discussions documenting the
information given to Vince and
Janice and their responses, including
verbatim quotes to demonstrate
their understanding. This is what the
courts will require if a case is ever
brought forth. Any signed “waiver”
document without the aforementioned
documentation of discussions is at
best useless in the eyes of a court, and
at worst, may be considered a form
of coercion—which is also clearly
addressed in the Federal Register
document (Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services, 2016).
What Should be Done?
Discussions about end-of-life
preferences, including decisions
about feeding tubes, should happen
more routinely for all people, but
particularly for persons with AD
(and much earlier in the disease
process). These discussions need
to be documented in the form of
HCA appointments, living wills, and
summaries in the medical record.
Absent that, the best the team can do
in this case is to identify the stage of
Brenda’s disease (i.e., whether she is
considered “terminal” and hospiceeligible), clarify her wishes, reflect
these in appropriate discharge orders
on the Maryland Medical Orders for
Life-Sustaining Treatment (MOLST)
form, and if appropriate, work with
hospice to arrange for home support.
Paula Leslie, PhD, FRCSLT (UK),
CCC-SLP (USA)
Program Director: Doctor of Clinical
Science (CScD)
Professor, Communication Science
and Disorders
Specialist Advisor (Swallowing
Disorders) RCSLT
University of Pittsburgh
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COMMENTS FROM
A HOSPITAL ETHICS
CONSULTANT
When one receives an Ethics
Consultation, the question originally
asked may or may not fully capture
the matter at hand. Brenda's physician
has asked whether forgoing the
g-tube might be considered a form
of elder neglect. The Centers for

Disease Control defines neglect
as: “failure by a caregiver or other
responsible person to protect an
elder from harm, or the failure to
meet needs for essential medical
care, nutrition, hydration, hygiene,
clothing, basic activities of daily
living or shelter, which results in a
serious risk of compromised health
and safety” (https://www.cdc.gov/
violenceprevention/elderabuse/
definitions.html).
When examining whether or not
placing a feeding tube may be a form
of elder neglect, one must examine
first whether its placement would
be clinically and ethically justified.
Feeding tubes are used to provide or
supplement nutrition when a patient
is incapable of taking (sufficient) food
orally, like Brenda. Although they
may be used to minimize aspiration
of stomach contents, this may still
occur with tube feedings. They may
be contraindicated in the face of
terminal illness, when a patient is
physiologically unable to tolerate
the placement of the tube, when the
patient would be unable to assimilate
the nutrition provided by it, or when
the patient is unable to tolerate
the tube itself and intentionally or
unintentionally pulls it out.
Before addressing the question
of neglect, Brenda's decision maker
and her physician have to decide
whether the placement of a feeding
tube is ethically justified. Brenda did
not complete an advance directive,
so there is no clear evidence of her
wishes about tube feedings. There is
also no evidence that placing her on
tube feedings will prolong her life or
improve her quality of life. Brenda
is still able to take food by mouth,
although it may not be sufficient to
sustain her. There is evidence she
is aspirating and she has now been
hospitalized twice for aspiration.
Even if steps are taken to minimize
the chance of aspiration, it is likely
that she will continue to aspirate.
Janice notes that Brenda would
not want a feeding tube because

she continues to enjoy eating and
drinking. Janice believes Brenda’s
quality of life will be significantly
diminished if she is unable to eat
or drink. Even if it was decided
that a feeding tube would provide
needed nutrition/hydration, it seems
unnecessary to restrict Brenda from
taking food and drink she enjoys.
There is a risk of aspiration present
in both circumstances. Further,
withholding things that enhance her
quality of life, given her presumed
inability to understand the risk they
pose for her, could be seen as harmful
to Brenda, as she may not understand
why she is not allowed or offered
food and drink. Though continuing
to eat and drink may constitute a
safety risk for Brenda, her legal
decision maker can discern that this
risk is acceptable given the benefit it
provides. The physician and team are
responsible for educating the decision
maker and caregivers on the risks
and ways of minimizing the risks to
Brenda, with or without the feeding
tube.
With regard to the question of
neglect, this requires not providing
for a basic need. What one needs is
dependent on circumstance. Brenda
suffers from a chronic, progressive,
long term illness that will bring about
her death, possibly within the next
six to twelve months. What care is
appropriate for her is discerned by
her physician and legal decision
maker in light of her “big picture.”
As the burden of the feeding tube
may outweigh its benefits, one can
argue that for Brenda, the tube may
not be appropriate. Though neglect
does not require intention, it is clear
here that if the feeding tube is not
placed, the intention is not to hasten
or cause Brenda’s death, but rather,
to avoid the physiologic and possible
emotional burdens that providing tube
feedings may cause.
Brenda’s physician is “reluctant”
to certify that Brenda is in a terminal
condition to qualify for hospice. This
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is not uncommon. Physicians often
hesitate to make this determination
for a multitude of reasons. Ethics
consultants can ask the “surprise”
question: “Would you be surprised if
your patient were to die in the next
6 months?” This, coupled with the
explicit criteria provided by CMS
for Hospice admission for patients
with dementia, can be useful to
physicians in making this assessment.
It is not the case, however, that a
patient must meet the criteria for
Hospice eligibility to decline life
sustaining treatment. If it were, then
there would be no place for informed
consent and surrogate decision
makers, as CMS would take on the
role of surrogate and prolong all life
sustaining treatment until Hospice
eligibility. Even if Brenda does not
have a prognosis that currently meets
Hospice eligibility criteria, the extent
to which life sustaining treatment
is going to be pursued is important
to explore. Regardless of whether
or not a feeding tube is placed,
conversation must be had about under
what conditions Brenda will return
to the hospital. If she aspirates and
gets aspiration pneumonia or suffers
other complications, what treatments
are appropriate for Brenda? It may be
decided that treatment with antibiotics
would be acceptable if they provide
more good than harm, but that the
harms of intubation for (pending)
respiratory failure would outweigh
any good, justifying withholding
intubation and mechanical
ventilation. Whether treatment
refusals by a surrogate are considered
appropriate or inappropriate requires
consideration of Brenda’s prognosis,
known preferences, and the medical
standard of care.
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Under Maryland law, if Brenda is
considered “terminal” as defined in
the Health Care Decisions Act, her
spouse or domestic partner would
be her legal decision-maker. The
legislature did not anticipate that
someone would have both at the
same time so legally it might be
an issue as to who can speak for
Brenda. Regardless of who fills this
role legally, her surrogate should
make decisions using substituted
judgment, deciding as Brenda
would, taking into consideration
her current illness, her values, her
quality of life, and the benefits and
burdens a particular treatment would
provide. It may be prudent to engage
both Vince and Janice in Brenda’s
decision making. Even if Vince is the
legally authorized decision maker,
it is likely that Brenda would trust
Janice to speak on her behalf, given
their relationship. Even if we do
not know that Brenda would have
chosen Janice as her health care
agent, if Vince believes that she
would have valued speaking with
Janice about this decision, she (and
anyone else she would have engaged)
should be included in Vince's
discernment. Vince may choose not
to act as Brenda’s surrogate decision
maker, given Brenda and Janice's
relationship, even though he remains
legally married to Brenda. If Vince
remains as decision maker, and he
and Janice disagree on Brenda’s
plan of care, the Ethics Consultant
could assist in an exploration of
Brenda’s values, what now enhances
her quality of life, and whether a
feeding tube (or other life-prolonging
interventions) would benefit her.
The consultant could also assist in
identifying any gaps in understanding

the benefits and burdens of a feeding
tube, the locus of any disagreement
between Vince and Janice, and assist
in ensuring that Brenda remains the
focus of the decision at hand. If the
disagreement remains, Janice could
petition the court for guardianship of
Brenda, but this is a lengthy process
and a decision would likely have
to be made on a more expedient
timeline. While Brenda is certainly
a vulnerable person deserving of
care and protection, it seems from
the case that she is surrounded by
persons who have her best interests in
mind. In fact, she is likely receiving
more direct caregiver interaction than
she would in a nursing home, and
much of the care is being provided
by her friends, those who knew her
before her cognitive and physical
decline. This bodes well for patientcentered decision-making that yields
compassionate, positive outcomes.
Birgitta N. Sujdak Mackiewicz, Ph.D.
Director of Ethics
OSF Saint Francis Medical Center &
Children's Hospital of Illinois
Peoria, IL

CALENDAR OF EVENTS
MARCH
2-4 Conflict Resolution and Clinical-Setting Mediation for
Healthcare, sponsored by the Center for Conflict Resolution in
Healthcare LLC, Memphis, TN. Visit: http://www.healthcaremediation.net/trainings.html.
22 (1-2PM) The Choice to Become a Research Subject: A First
Person Perspective, Webinar Discussion led by Rebecca Dresser,
JD, Washington University in St. Louis, available at msubioethics.
clickwebinar.com/brownbag. Visit: http://www.bioethics.msu.edu/
brownbag-webinar/2016-2017-series.

RECURRING EVENTS
Ethics for Lunch Seminars, sponsored by the
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics and
Ethics Committee, Sheik Zayed Tower Chevy
Chase Conference Center (1800 Orleans St.)
Baltimore, MD. 12N-1:15PM. Visit: http://www.
bioethicsinstitute.org/efl
March 21
April 18
May 16

23-24 Fourth National Nursing Ethics Conference, Los Angeles,
CA. Visit: http://ethicsofcaring.org/registration/.
24-25 Clinical Ethics Bootcamp, sponsored by Children's
Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN. Contact: Nneka.Sederstrom@
ChildrensMN.Org.
24-26 Re-enchanting Medicine: Conference on Medicine and
Religion, JW Marriott Galleria, Houston, TX. Visit: http://www.
medicineandreligion.com/.
27 (1-2PM) Webinar with James Mumford, PhD: Reproduction
in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction, sponsored by Children’s
Mercy Bioethics Center. Visit: https://cmhbioethics.webex.com/.
APRIL
3 (1-2PM) Webinar with Larry Churchill, PhD, “What would you
do if this were your child, Doc?” sponsored by Children’s Mercy
Bioethics Center. Visit: https://cmhbioethics.webex.com/.

Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics
Seminar Series, either at Sheik Zayed Tower
Chevy Chase Conference Center (1800 Orleans
St.) or Feinstone Hall, E2030, Bloomberg
School of Public Health (615 N. Wolfe St.)
Baltimore, MD. 12N-1:15PM. Visit: http://
www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/
seminar-series
March 12 - Speaker: Lisa Lehmann, MD, PhD,
MSc, Executive Director of the National Center
for Ethics in Health Care
March 27 - Speaker: Ruha Benjamin, MA,
PhD, Informed Refusal: Towards a Justice-based
Bioethics

6 Action for Health Equity, sponsored by the University of
Maryland Schools of Medicine and Public Health, Adele H. Stamp
Student Union, University of Maryland College Park.

April 10 - Speaker: Chris Feudtner, MD PhD,
MPH, Steven D. Handler Endowed Chair of
Medical Ethics; Director, Department of Medical
Ethics, The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia

7-8 Second Annual Conference on Reproductive Ethics: New Ideas
and Innovations, Sponsored by Alden March Bioethics Institute,
Albany Medical College, Albany, NY. Visit: http://www.amc.edu/
academic/bioethics/reproductiveethicsconference.cfm.

April 24 - Speaker: Dale Jamieson, MA,
PhD, Professor of Environmental Studies &
Philosophy, NYU School of Law

16 (1-2PM) Social Determinants of Behavioral Health, Webinar
Discussion led by C. Debra Furr-Holden, PhD, Michigan State
University, available at msubioethics.clickwebinar.com/brownbag.
Visit: http://www.bioethics.msu.edu/brownbag-webinar/2016-2017series.
18-21 Intensive Bioethics Course, sponsored by Houston Methodist
Hospital and The Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy at
Baylor College of Medicine, Houston Methodist Research Institute,
Houston, TX. Visit: http://events.houstonmethodist.org/bioethics.
MAY
25-28 Workshop in Clinical Ethics Mediation, sponsored by the
Program in Clinical Conflict Management at the University of
Pennsylvania. Visit: http://medicalethics.med.upenn.edu/education/
master-of-bioethics-mbe/clinical-ethics-mediation.

May 8 - Speaker: Joseph Fins, MD, E. William
Davis, Jr. M.D. Professor of Medical Ethics,
Weill Cornell Medical College

Ethics Lunch Rounds (lunch & CME provided),
Sponsored by the University of Maryland
Medical Center Ethics Committee, 22 S.
Greene St., Borges Conference Room (N2E30).
12N-1PM. For more information, contact:
hsilverm@medicine.umaryland.edu
March 24
April 21
May 12
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The Law & Health Care Program
Maryland Health Care Ethics
Committee Network
University of Maryland
Francis King Carey School of Law
500 W. Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201

The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a membership organization, established by the Law and
Health Care Program at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is to facilitate
and enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making in health care settings by supporting and providing informational
and educational resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in the state of Maryland. The Network attempts to
achieve this goal by:
•

Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate ethical dilemmas within their institution and as they strive to
assist their institution act consistently with its mission statement;

•

Fostering communication and information sharing among Network members;

•

Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other healthcare providers, and members of the general
public on ethical issues in health care; and

•

Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees and ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.

MHECN appreciates the support of its individual and institutional members. MHECN also welcomes support from affiliate
members who provide additional financial support.

SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM
THE MID-ATLANTIC ETHICS COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER
NAME
ORGANIZATION
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE, ZIP
TELEPHONE/FAX NOS.
E-MAIL
No. of Subscriptions Requested:
Individual Subscriptions		
Institutional (MHECN 		
@ $35/yr.				
non-member) Subscriptions
						
@ $90/yr. (up to 20 copies)
Please make checks payable to: The University of Maryland
and mail to:
The University of Maryland School of Law
		
Law & Health Care Program - MHECN
		
500 West Baltimore Street
		
Baltimore, MD 21201
For information on MHECN membership rates, contact us at
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or (410) 706-4457 or visit http://www.law.umaryland.edu/mhecn

All correspondence
including articles, cases,
events, letters should
be sent to:
Diane E. Hoffmann
Editor
The Mid-Atlantic Ethics
Committee Newsletter
University of Maryland
Francis King Carey
School of Law
L&HCP
500 W. Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
E-mail: dhoffmann@
law.umaryland.edu

